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The fraction of persons holding a college degree differs nearly two-fold across U.S. states. 
This paper documents data related to state educational attainment differences and explores 
possible explanations. It shows that highly educated states employ skillbiased technologies, 
specialize in skill-intensive industries, but do not pay lower skill premia than do less educated 
states. Moreover, measures of urbanization and population density are positively related to 
educational attainment. Theories based on agglomeration economies offer natural 
explanations for these observations. 
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Educational attainment diﬀers substantially across U.S. states. In the ﬁve most educated
states, 34% of residents hold a college degree compared with only 18% in the ﬁve least edu-
cated states.1 The purpose of this paper is to document diﬀerences in educational attainment
across U.S. states and to investigate possible explanations.
Understanding why educational attainment diﬀers is of obvious public policy interest.
States undertake substantial eﬀorts aimed at improving the educational attainment of their
residents. Developing a positive theory of local attainment diﬀerences is a necessary precursor
for analyzing such policies. Diﬀerences in educational attainment may also be an important
source of variations in income and labor productivity across states.
The paper documents the following main facts:
1. More educated states employ more skilled workers in a given industry.
2. More educated states specialize in skill-intensive industries.
3. Diﬀerences in educational attainment across states or metropolitan areas (MAs) are
not correlated with skill premia, even within industries.
These ﬁndings suggest that more educated places employ more skill-biased technologies
within each industry. I develop a simple model where locations are endowed with industry-
neutral diﬀerences in technological skill biases. Workers are perfectly mobile so that wage
rates are equalized across locations. I show that this simple model accounts for more than
90% of the variation in college attainment observed across state-industry pairs. By con-
trast, diﬀerences in regional skill prices play only a small role in accounting for educational
attainment gaps.
The key challenge for understanding why educational attainment diﬀers across U.S. states
is therefore to understand the sources of skill biased technology diﬀerences. Why do some
places employ skill-biased technologies across all industries, given that relative skill prices do
not diﬀer from other locations? I argue that agglomeration economies oﬀer a natural expla-
nation. Consistent with this idea, the empirical analysis shows that educational attainment
is correlated with a number of measures of agglomeration economies, such as urbanization
and population density. A number of agglomeration theories suggest that larger places are
more productive because they oﬀer better opportunities for specialized knowledge. Helsley
and Strange (1990) argue that larger places permit better matches of worker skills and job
characteristics. Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990) suggest that larger places sustain more
varieties of non-tradeable intermediate inputs, such as business services.2 I develop models
based on these ideas that account qualitatively for the relationship between population size,
educational attainment, and skill premia observed in U.S. data.
Even though the focus of this paper is attainment diﬀerences across states, agglomeration
theories suggest that the appropriate unit of observation is the city, not the state. I therefore
present data for metropolitan areas (MAs) as well as states where such data are available.
1These ﬁgures are for persons aged 26 to 60 in 1990. Section 2 describes the data in detail.
2See Duranton and Puga (2003) for a survey of the literature on agglomeration economies.
2To my knowledge, this is the ﬁr s ta t t e m p tt oa c c o u n tf o rd i ﬀerences in educational
attainment across U.S. states. Still, this paper is related to a large body of earlier work.
Goldin (1998, 1999) studies the emergence of secondary education in the U.S. around 1920.
Her analysis has obvious implications for regional attainment diﬀerences, but the focus is
on a somewhat diﬀerent question and on an earlier time period. Bound et al. (2004) study
”how the production of college graduates at the state level aﬀects the stock of college-
educated workers in the state” (p. 147). Kaboski (2003) studies diﬀerences in the returns
to education across countries. He develops a model that also accounts for diﬀerences in the
level of education. Glaeser (1999) and Glaeser and Mare (2001) suggest that cities are more
educated because they oﬀer better opportunities for learning.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and documents diﬀer-
ences in educational attainment across U.S. states. Section 2.2 develops a measurement
framework that helps interpret the data. The relationship between skill premia and educa-
tional attainment is documented in section 3. Section 4 measures the importance of industry
specialization for attainment diﬀerences. Theories that account for the patterns observed in
the data are developed in section 5. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2D i ﬀerences in Educational Attainment Across U.S. States
This section documents how educational attainment diﬀers across U.S. states. The objective
is to describe a set of observations that a theory of educational attainment should account
for.
Data Sources: The data are drawn from a variety of sources which are described in detail
in the appendix. The main data sources are the Decennial Censuses from 1940 to 1990.
Earlier years do not contain data on educational attainment.3 Individuals are dropped if
they live in group quarters, if they are younger than age 26 or older than age 60. Age 26
is chosen such that most persons have completed education. Age 60 is chosen so that most
persons participate in the labor market. Educational attainment is measured by years of
completed schooling. A person with at least 16 years of schooling is classiﬁed as holding a
college degree. I refer to such persons as "skilled."
The geographic units considered are states and metropolitan areas (MAs). Because of
its special status, the District of Columbia is dropped from the sample. The geographic
composition of MAs diﬀers between census years. Occasionally, the data are augmented with
additional sources that cover ﬁner geographic detail (below the MA level) or that contain
information about regional aggregates that cannot be computed from the PUMS data, such
as land area. More detail is provided in the Appendix.
From the perspective of some theories that might account for regional attainment diﬀer-
ences, cities are the natural geographic units. However, since not all data are available and
s i n c es a m p l es i z e sc a nb es m a l la tt h eM Al e v e l ,t h em a i nf o c u so ft h ep a p e ri st ou n d e r s t a n d
attainment diﬀerences across states. Wherever possible, I present data at the MA level as
well as the state level.
Most of the ﬁndings reported in this paper are based on 1990 data. Results for 1980 are
similar, except where explicitly noted. Results for earlier years are qualitatively similar, but
3Baier et al. (2004) construct state education data at decadal frequency between 1840 and 2000.
3can be quite diﬀerent quantitatively. To some extent these diﬀerences may be due to the
much smaller sample sizes or to diﬀerences in geographic coverage in earlier years. In early
years, when many persons did not graduate from high school, it may also be less appropriate
to divide the population in skilled and unskilled workers based on whether they hold a college
degree.
2.1 Basic Observations
The focus of this paper are diﬀerences across U.S. states in the fraction of persons holding a
college degree. I refer to this fraction as college attainment, λ. Table 1 reports that college
attainment in the ﬁve most educated states averages 34% in 1990. By contrast, in the ﬁve
least educated states attainment averages only 18%. This is the central fact to be explained:
college attainment diﬀers nearly two-fold across U.S. states.
State Attainment State Attainment
MA 35.5 MS 19.1
CT 35.1 NV 18.2
NJ 33.5 KY 17.8
MD 32.1 AR 17.7
CO 31.7 WV 16.4
Mean 33.6 Mean 17.8
Table 1. College attainment across U.S. states.
Persistence: College attainment is quite persistent over time. The correlation coeﬃcient
o v e rt h ep e r i o d1 9 4 0t o1 9 9 0i s0 . 4 7 . T h e r ei sn os t r o n ge v i d e n c et h a ts t a t ea t t a i n m e n t s
converge over time. The absolute attainment gap between the most educated states and the
least educated states rose slightly between 1940 and 1990. However, since mean attainment
increased substantially, the coeﬃcient of variation declined from 0.25 to 0.19. Using mean
years of schooling as the measure of education shows much stronger convergence. The gap
between the top ﬁve states and the bottom ﬁve states fell from 3 years in 1940 to 1 year in
1990.
In what follows I examine which variables are correlated with state attainment. The
choice of variables is motivated by theories that might account for regional attainment dif-
ferences.
2.1.1 Demographics
Table 1 aggregates attainment over persons with very diﬀerent demographic characteristics.
This raises the question whether diﬀerences in the age/race/sex composition of the popula-
tion are important for attainment diﬀerences across states. To shed light on this question, I
decompose attainment diﬀerences into the contributions of (i) attainment variations among
persons of identical characteristics and (ii) variations in the demographic composition of the
population.
Speciﬁcally, I divide the population in each state into 5-year age cells, 3 race cells (white,
black, other) and 2 sex cells (male and female). For each cell k, I calculate college attainment
in state m, denoted by λk,m, and the fraction of the state’s population in the cell, ωk,m.





Denote by ωk.US the fraction of the U.S. population in cell k and by λk,US the U.S. fraction
of college graduates in each cell. To measure the importance of demographic composition, I





By eliminating attainment diﬀerences among households with identical characteristics, ˆ λm
isolates the contribution of demographic weights. Figure 1 plots ˆ λm against λm for 1990
data. Only a small fraction of state attainment variation is accounted for by demographic
weights. Regressing ˆ λm against λm yields a slope coeﬃcient of only 0.037 (R2 =0 .024).













































































Figure 1: College attainment diﬀerences due to demographic structure.
In a similar way the contribution of attainment diﬀerences among persons with similar






By eliminating variation in demographic composition, ˜ λm isolates the role of cross-state
diﬀerences in cell means. Regressing ˜ λm against λm yields a slope of 0.93 which is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1 (R2 =0 .93). I conclude that demographic composition accounts
for only a small part of the variation in educational attainment across U.S. states.
52.1.2 Supply of Graduates
Bound et al. (2004) study whether states that produce more college graduates also employ
more college graduates. They ﬁnd "at best only a modest link" (p. 147). For completeness,
Ic o n ﬁrm Bound et al.’s result in my data. I regress state attainment on the number of
college graduates per person and on the college wage premium in the state. The number
of graduates is constructed from the Digest of Education Statistics, 2002 (table 249) for
the 1999-2000 academic year. The calculation of the college wage premium is described in
section 2.2.
Consistent with the intuition from a simple supply and demand framework, the coeﬃcient
for the number of graduates is positive (3.46,s . e .1.44), while that for the skill premium is
negative, though not statistically signiﬁcant (−0.067,s . e .0.068). However, the explanatory
power of the regression is weak with an R2 of only 0.13. One interpretation is that worker
mobility across states results in approximate relative factor price equalization.
2.1.3 Agglomeration Eﬀects
In this section, I present evidence that larger or more densely populated places are more
educated, suggesting that agglomeration economies may account for regional education gaps.
At the state level, attainment is positively related to measures of urbanization. Regressing
state attainment against the fraction of the population living in MAs yields a coeﬃcient
of 0.099 (s.e. 0.031, R2 =0 .18) . O n er e a s o nf o rt h ep o s i t i v er e l a t i o n s h i pi st h a tM A
residents are substantially more educated than non-MA residents. Figure 2 shows mean
state attainment inside and outside MAs for 1990. Two observations are important: (a)
Attainment outside of MAs is, on average, 9 percentage points lower than within MAs (18%
vs. 27%). (b) States with high MA attainment also have high non-MA attainment. The
correlation coeﬃcients between state college attainment and the fraction of the population
living in urban areas or in MSAs ranges from 0.38 to 0.64 across all years.4
Among city residents, those living in larger cities are more educated. A regression of MA
college attainment on log population yields a coeﬃcient of 0.025 (s.e. 0.006, R2 =0 .08).
Population size accounts for 5.1% of the 17.1% attainment gap between the most educated
and the least educated cities.5
A similar picture emerges for urban versus rural areas. The exact deﬁnition of urban
areas in the PUMS data varies over time. Typically, places with more than 2,500 residents
are classiﬁed as urban. Around two-thirds of households live in urban areas in all years with
data. Figure 3 shows data for 1990. Again, two observations are important: (a) Attainment
in urban areas is 10 percentage points higher than in rural areas (28% versus 18% in 1990).
(b) States with high urban attainment also have high rural attainment.
To measure the potential role of agglomeration economies, I regress state attainment on
various measures of agglomeration in 1990: the fraction of the population living in MAs,
the fraction living in urban areas, the average population size of MAs in the state, and the
population density in the state. Since the regressors are strongly correlated, the individual
4This excludes the years 1960 and 1970 where it is not known whether many households resided in urban
or rural areas.
5That is, the predicted attainment gap between cities in the 90th versus the 10th percentile of the
population size distribution is 5.1%. The observed gap between the 90th versus the 10th percentile of the
attainment distribution is 17.1%.

















































































Figure 2: College attainment: MAs versus non-MAs
regression coeﬃcients are not informative. However, taken together, these regressors account
for 33% of the variation in attainment across the 47 states for which data are available.
Including Ciccone and Hall’s (1996) measure of density increases R2 to 0.52. These ﬁnding
suggests that agglomeration economies could account for a substantial share of cross-state
variation in educational attainment.
Summary: The data presented in this section suggest that a theory of educational attain-
ment should account for the following facts:
1. College attainment diﬀers by a factor of two across U.S. states.
2. These diﬀerences are persistent over time.
3. Attainment is only weakly correlated with the supply of graduates and with the skill
premium.
4. Attainment is positively related to measures of agglomeration, such as population size
or density.
2.2 Measurement Framework
In this section, I set up a model that helps to interpret the data and to clarify why attainment
diﬀe r sa c r o s sl o c a t i o n s .T h e r ea r eM locations, indexed by m, which could represent states
or cities. There are I industries, indexed by i, and a large number of individuals, indexed
by j. Good i is produced in location m from skilled labor, Hm,i, and unskilled labor, Lm,i




















































































Figure 3: College attainment: rural versus urban areas
Industries diﬀer in their skill weights µi where the weights on unskilled labor are normalized
to unity. In addition, the production function allows for industry-neutral diﬀerences in skilled
labor augmenting technology, ϕm. The motivation for this assumption will become evident
when industry-level data are presented in section 4. For most of the analysis, there is no
need to impose restrictions on the productivity coeﬃcients Am,i.
Proﬁt maximization of price-taking ﬁr m si m p l i e st h a tf a c t o r sare paid their marginal
products:




















where pm,i is the price of good i in place m. Skill premia are given by
wH,m,i
wL,m,i
= µi ϕm (Hm,i/Lm,i)
ρ−1 (2)
In permitting skill premia to diﬀer across industries, the model allows for restrictions in
worker mobility between industries. None of the ﬁndings depend on this assumption because
deviations from relative factor price equalization turn out to be unimportant for understand-
ing attainment gaps across locations.
In the absence of technology diﬀerences, the model has familiar Heckscher-Ohlin implica-
tions. If relative factor prices are equalized across locations, then a given industry employs
the same fraction of skilled labor in every location. If relative factor prices are not equalized,
then skill premia are low in places where Hm,i/Lm,i is high for any given industry.
Empirical estimates place the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor
between 1.2 and 2 (see Ciccone and Peri 2004 and the references cited therein). Based on
these estimates I set ρ =0 .4 which implies a substitution elasticity of 1.67.
82.3 Measurement
In measuring labor inputs, it is necessary to account for the possibility that workers in the
same education class diﬀer in their labor eﬃciency. I estimate person j’s eﬃciency using a
standard Mincerian earnings equation of the form
lng(ej,x j,z j)=β0 + β1ej + β2xj + β3x
2
j + β4zj + εj (3)
where e denotes years of schooling, x is experience, and z denotes other demographic charac-
teristics (race and sex). Labor eﬃciency (g) is proxied for using nominal hourly wage rates.
The equation is estimated for the entire U.S. working population, but separately for skilled




g(ej,x j,z j) lj (4)
where lj denotes hours worked and the sum covers all persons working in industry i and
location m.A s i m i l a r e q u a t i o n d e ﬁnes unskilled labor input, Lm,i. I abstract from the
possibility that workers diﬀer in their unmeasured skills. For most of my results this only
matters if skilled workers diﬀer from unskilled workers within a given location or industry.
In that case, estimated college attainment
ηm,i = Hm,i/(Hm,i + Lm,i) (5)
diﬀers from the true one. For reasons discussed in appendix B, this possibility is not pursued
in the analysis.
Conceptually, measuring labor input in eﬃciency units is more satisfactory than simply
counting the number of persons employed. However, quantitatively both measures yield very
similar results. The correlation coeﬃcient between ηm and λm at the state level is 0.97 and
the slope of a regression of ηm on λm is 0.92.
It is convenient to work with wage bills, which are directly observed, rather than with
wage rates per eﬃciency unit of labor (wH,m,i,w L,m,i) which are not directly observed. Wage
bills are deﬁned as
WH,m,i =wH,m,i Hm,i (6)
WL,m,i =wL,m,i Lm,i (7)
T h ew a g eb i l lr a t i oi sg i v e nb y
WH,m,i
WL,m,i
= µi ϕm (Hm,i/Lm,i)
ρ (8)
This equation is useful for estimating the parameters of the production function. The skill










One way of gauging whether diﬀerences in attainment are due to variations in the demand for
education or to variations in the supply of educated labor is to study the relationship between
skill premia and attainment. The main ﬁnding is that skill premia do not systematically
vary with college attainment across states or cities. In this section I abstract from multiple
industries, but I show below that a similar ﬁnding holds within industries.
At the state level, the correlation between skill premia and college attainment is negative
in some years and positive in others, but always weak. Figure 4 shows state data for 1990.
The correlation coeﬃcient is −0.13 (+0.04 in 1980). A 20 percentage point increase in college
attainment is associated with a drop in the skill premium from 1.55 to 1.50. Results at the
MA level are similar.







































































Figure 4: State college attainment and skill premia
The weak correlation between attainment and skill premia is important. It suggests either
that skilled and unskilled labor are very highly substitutable or that highly educated places
employ technologies that are relatively skill intensive. The former interpretation is diﬃcult
to reconcile with empirical estimates of substitution elasticities. If technologies (ϕm)d on o t
diﬀer across states, then the 1990 data imply a substitution elasticity between skilled and
unskilled labor near 30. But empirical estimates place the substitution elasticity around 1.5
(Ciccone and Peri 2004). Even with a substitution elasticity of 4, an increase in the college
fraction from 0.2 to 0.4 should be associated with a drop in the skill premium from 1.55 to
1.22, compared with a drop to 1.50 in the data.
An alternative interpretation is that more educated places employ more skill biased tech-
nologies. Theories of directed technical change could rationalize this fact (Acemoglu 2002).
Using the measurement framework developed in section 2.2 with a single industry, the value
10of ϕm for each state or MA may be calculated from
wH,m
wL,m
= µϕ m (Hm/Lm)
ρ−1 (10)
where µ may be normalized to 1.
Figure 5 plots skill weights and college attainments for states in 1990. The correlation
coeﬃcient is 0.95. Similar results are obtained for other years or for data at the MA level.
Moreover, MAs with growing attainment also experience faster growth of ϕm.F o rt h ep e r i o d
1980 to 1990 the correlation between attainment changes and ϕm changes is 0.74. These
observation suggests that diﬀerences in the demand for skilled labor may be important for
understanding educational attainment diﬀerences across cities and states.



























































Figure 5: State college attainments and skill weights.
Next, I measure the fractions of college attainment diﬀerences that are accounted for by
diﬀerences in skill premia and skill weights. Inverting (10) yields an expression for college
attainment. To quantify the importance of skill premia, I calculate predicted attainment
based on the observed skill premia, πm, but imposing the U.S. average ϕ:
g Hm/Lm =( ϕUS /π m)
1/(1−ρ) .
The predicted attainments are essentially uncorrelated with observed attainments, as shown
in ﬁgure 6 for 1990 MA data. Similar results are obtained for 1980 and for state data. I
conclude that diﬀerences in skill premia account for a negligible fraction of state or MA
attainment gaps.
To quantify the importance of diﬀerences in skill weights, I calculate the predicted values
of Hm/Lm with the values of ϕm estimated for each MA, but imposing the U.S. average skill
premium (πUS):
d Hm/Lm =( ϕm /π US)
1/(1−ρ) .
11The predicted college attainments are nearly identical with the data values (the correlation
is 0.95). Similar results are obtained from state data.
One interpretation is that a model which correctly predicts the values of ϕm can account
for more the 90% of the variation in attainment across MAs. This is true, even if the model
abstracts from diﬀerences in factor prices across MAs. In what follows, the analysis will
therefore abstract from obstacles to labor mobility and focus on models that imply relative
factor price equalization.6







































SMA College Fraction With US Skill Weights
Figure 6: Predicted MA attainement with common skill weights
The key problem is then to understand why ϕm diﬀers across locations. Two classes
of theories come to mind. One class of theories holds that educated places specialize in
skill intensive industries while employing the same fraction of skilled workers within each
industry. A Heckscher-Ohlin model with factor price equalization makes this prediction. A
second class of theories holds that locations diﬀer in the skill intensity of technologies within
each industry. Therefore, educated places employ more skilled workers in all industries. The
next section attempts to measure the relative importance of industry specialization and skill
bias diﬀerences for understanding college attainment gaps across states.7
4 Industry Specialization
With multiple industries, diﬀerences in skill weights across locations could reﬂect diﬀerences
in industry employment shares. Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory oﬀers an interpretation along
these lines. In fact, all of the data reported so far are consistent with a Heckscher-Ohlin
model with factor price equalization. Within each industry this model predicts that H/L
6This is consistent with Bound et al.’s (2004, p. 147) ﬁnding of "at best only a modest link" between the
production and employment of college graduates across U.S. states.
7A third possibility is that workers diﬀer in unmeasured skills across locations. Appendix B discusses
why this possibility is not pursued further in the paper.
12should be the same in all states, but more educated places should specialize in skill-intensive
industries. I investigate these predictions using data on industry employment and wages at
the state level for 1990 (results for 1980 are similar). The industry classiﬁcation is taken
from PUMS data and distinguishes roughly 400 industries.
Skilled states employ more skilled labor in all industries: First, I investigate the
prediction that Hm,i/Lm,i is the same for all states for a given industry. Direct inspection of





against state attainment (ηm) for all states with data. In ﬁve out of the six
industries a strong positive correlation is visible with slopes that are close to one.
To see whether this pattern holds across all industries, I estimate the following equation
for each state-industry pair (m,i) via OLS:
ηm,i = β0 + βηηm + γDi + εm,i
where Di is a vector of industry dummies. The Heckscher-Ohlin model with factor price
equalization predicts that βη =0 . That is, more educated states should not employ more
college graduates in a given industry than do less educated states. The point estimate for
βη in 1990 using the full industry detail available in the Census data is 0.745 (s.e. 0.038).
States with 10% more college graduates employ, on average, 7% more college graduates in
each industry. This ﬁnding is strongly at variance with Heckscher-Ohlin theory with factor
price equalization.
Skill premia are not correlated with attainment: One interpretation is that factor
price equalization fails to hold in the data. A Heckscher-Ohlin model then predicts, by virtue
of (8) and (9), that skill premia should be low in states with high attainment for a given
industry. However, in the data, skill premia within industries are essentially uncorrelated
with college attainment. To establish this ﬁnding, I estimate the skill premium condition (2)
under the assumption that all states share the same ϕ. Speciﬁcally, I estimate via OLS
lnπm,i =l n( µi/(1 − µi)) + (ρ − 1)ln(Hm,i/Lm,i)
where ln(µi/(1 − µi)) becomes the coeﬃcient on an industry dummy. Based on the empirical
estimates summarized in Ciccone and Peri (2004), I set ρ =0 .4.
Figure 8 plots the industry-state skill premia net of industry dummies, πm,i−ln(µi/(1 − µi)),
against ln(Hm,i/Lm,i). If all states employed the same technologies within a given industry,
the data points should lie along a downward sloping line of slope ρ−1.I nt h ed a t a ,b yc o n -
trast, skill premia are nearly uncorrelated with industry attainment.8 One interpretation is
that more educated states employ more skill biased technologies with higher ϕm.T h ev a l u e s
of ϕm can be estimated jointly with the values of µi from (2) via nonlinear least squares.
The resulting correlation coeﬃcient between ϕm and ηm is 0.8 for states in 1990.
Educated states specialize in skill-intensive industries: The results presented so
far are inconsistent with a Heckscher-Ohlin model, unless states diﬀer in the values of ϕm.
However, this does not imply that industry specialization is not important for state education
gaps. Consistent with the model’s prediction, educated states specialize in skill-intensive
8Using a similar approach, Peri (1998) ﬁnds that skill premia are higher in more educated cities.
13  14

















































































































































































































Figure 8: Skill premia for industry-state pairs
industries. To establish this fact, I rank industries by their estimated values of µi and states
by their college attainments, ηm.I ﬁnd that the 10 most educated state employ 46% of
labor in top quartile of industries, compared with 39% for the 10 least educated states. In
the bottom quartile of industries the 10 most educated states employ 26% of their labor
compared with 36% for the 10 least educated states. Results are very similar if industries
are ranked by U.S. average education instead of µi.
How important is specialization? This raises the question how important industry
specialization is for understanding college attainment gaps. I draw on the estimated values
of ϕm and µi to decompose attainment gaps into the contributions of industry specialization,
skill biases (ϕm), and skill premia.
The ﬁrst ﬁnding is that the skill premium equation, repeated here from (2),
wH,m,i
wL,m,i
= µi ϕm (Hm,i/Lm,i)
ρ−1
predicts more than 90% of the variation in college attainment across state-industry pairs.
That is, given estimates of µi,ϕ m, and skill premia, (2) implies college attainment levels
for each state-industry pair. Regressing predicted against observed attainment yields an
R2 greater than 0.9 in 1980 and 1990. This result supports the restriction imposed on the
production functions that diﬀerences in ϕm are approximately industry-neutral.W h a t e v e r
causes diﬀerences in the demand for skilled labor appears to aﬀect all industries within a
state symmetrically. This is an important ﬁnding that severely restricts the set of theories
that could account for the data.
The second ﬁnding is that diﬀerences in skill premia are not important for understanding
state attainment gaps. To support this claim, I predict state-industry attainment from
(2) using U.S. average skill premia by industry. Figure 9 plots predicted against observed
15attainment using 1990 data. Regressing predicted against observed attainment yields a slope
coeﬃcient of 0.91 and an R2 of 0.9. In other words, a model with perfect labor mobility
and relative factor price equalization that correctly predicts the ϕm would account for 90%
of the attainment variation across industries and states. This ﬁnding is consistent with
Bernard et al.’s (2002) conclusion that relative factor price equalization holds across U.S.
states, allowing for industry-neutral factor-speciﬁct e c h n o l o g yd i ﬀerences.












































Figure 9: Predicted attainment for industry-state pairs.
To quantify the importance of skill bias diﬀerences, I aggregate the predicted values of




˜ ηm,i ωUS,i (11)
This removes the eﬀects of industry specialization and retains the eﬀects of diﬀerences in
ϕm across states. Figure 10 plots the predicted against the observed state attainment for
1990 (all results are very similar for 1980). The slope of an OLS regression line is 0.47. In
this sense, diﬀerences in ϕm account for nearly half of attainment diﬀerences. Note that this
method imputes attainment for a rather large part of the work force in most states. The
reason is that a given state typically has zero employment in many industries (Rosenthal and
Strange 2002).9 This raises concerns that small errors in the estimated ϕm could be enlarged
by the imputation. If ˜ ηm is calculated either with more aggregated industries or by only
aggregating over industries where the state has positive employment, then the slope rises
to around 0.8. However, this approach presumably fails to remove some eﬀects of industry
specialization.
9Or a state has so few observations that industry attainment cannot be calculated reliably, in which case
I drop the industry-state pair.
16To quantify the importance of industry specialization, I calculate the values of ηm,i from
(2) imposing the U.S. average ϕ.T h ep r e d i c t e dˆ ηm,i are then aggregated to the state level




ˆ ηm,i ωm,i (12)
This measure removes the eﬀects of skill-bias diﬀerences, but retains the eﬀects of industry
specialization. Figure 11 plots predicted against observed state attainment. The slope is 0.53
leading me to conclude that specialization accounts for slightly more than half of attainment
diﬀerences.













































































Figure 10: State attainment net of industry specialization
An alternative implementation uses observed rather than predicted attainment in (11)
and (12). That is, the predicted ˜ ηm,i are replaced with ηm,i in (11) and the predicted ˆ ηm,i
are replaced with U.S. average attainment for each industry in (12). This implementation
yields similar results. However, this method only permits to aggregate over industries where
attainment is observed for each state in (11). This does not fully capture the eﬀects of
industry specialization.
Taken together, these observations suggest that industry specialization and diﬀerences
in skill bias within industries account for roughly half of observed college attainment gaps
across U.S. states. Diﬀerences in skill premia account for a negligible fraction.
5T h e o r i e s
This section outlines a model of educational attainment that qualitatively accounts for the
facts documented in this paper:
1. Skill premia do not covary with attainment by location or by location-industry.









































































Figure 11: State attainment net of skill bias diﬀerences
2. Educated places employ more educated labor in every industry.
3. Educated places specialize in skill intensive industries.
4. Educated places are endowed with skill-biased technologies across all industries (high
ϕm).
5.1 A Reduced Form Model
It is useful to begin by describing a reduced form model which accounts for these observations.
I only sketch this model because not all details are needed to derive the implications of
interest. The basic idea is that diﬀerences in skill weights (ϕm) across locations lead to
diﬀerences in attainment within industries and to industry specialization. The key model
features are:
1. The world lasts for one period.
2. There are M locations and I industries.
3. The production functions are given by (1). Impose Am,i = A so that places diﬀer only
in their ϕm. Assume further that ρ<1 based on empirical estimates.
4. All markets are perfectly competitive.
5. All goods are costlessly traded.
6. There are L unskilled workers and H skilled workers. Workers move costlessly between
locations to maximize consumption.
187. Agglomeration costs (g) increase in employment: g0 (Lm + Hm) > 0.A w o r k e r w h o
earns w in location m consumes w/g(Lm + Hm).
Such a theory accounts for the three observations highlighted above:
1. Labor mobility across industries equalizes industry wages in a given location: ws,m,i =
ws,m ∀ i, s = H,L. Mobility across locations equalizes wages net of migration costs,
ws,m = ws g(Lm + Hm), and implies relative factor price equalization. This may be a
good description of the data. As pointed out by Glaeser and Mare (1999), wage rates
divided by cost of living indices do not seem to vary systematically by city size, even
though larger cities are more productive.
2. Free trade equalizes the prices of goods across locations: pm,i = pi ∀ m.T h e r e f o r e ,
by (2), places with high ϕm employ larger amounts of skilled labor in every industry:
ϕm >ϕ ˆ m ⇒ ηm,i >ηˆ m,i∀i.
3 .T os e et h a tp l a c e sw i t hh i g hϕm specialize in high µ i n d u s t r i e s ,n o t et h a tt h eu n i tc o s t








where π = wH,m/wL,m is the skill premium that is common to all places. It follows
that places with high ϕm have a comparative advantage in products with high µi in
the sense that


















It follows that places with high ϕm have an absolute advantage in all goods which is
oﬀset by higher wages. Since |∂ lncm,i/∂ϕm| is increasing in µi, such places also have
a comparative advantage in goods with high µi.
4. If places with high ϕm specialize in products with high µi and use more educated labor
within each industry, then aggregate H/L is also high in these places.
It was shown earlier that the theory outlined here accounts for 90% of the variation in
attainment across industry-state pairs, if it correctly predicts the ϕm (see ﬁgure 9). To what
extent the model quantitatively accounts for industry specialization is an open question. The
answer obviously depends on model features, such as household preferences, which do not
interact with the model properties described above.
The key issue for understanding why educational attainment diﬀe r sa c r o s ss t a t e si st h e nt o
understand the determinants of ϕm. In the next section I argue that agglomeration theories
are promising. The reason is that larger and denser places employ more skilled workers
without paying lower skill premia, suggesting that ϕm is related to the size or density of
19a market. This arises naturally in agglomeration theories. In a number of such theories,
agglomeration economies arise because of the interaction of workers with specialized skills
or ﬁrms with specialized knowledge. It appears natural to conjecture that the productivity
of skilled workers beneﬁts more from agglomeration economies than the productivity of
unskilled workers. Below I present two examples of such theories based on matching of
skilled workers and based on non-tradeable intermediate goods.
5.2 A Matching Model
In this section, I develop a model where the matching of workers to jobs generates a positive
relationship between city population size and skill bias of the technology in use. The basic
idea is that larger cities sustain more ﬁr m sa n dh e n c ep e r m i tb e t t e rm a t c h e s .T h em o d e li s
based on Duranton and Puga (2003).
T h ew o r l dl a s t sf o ro n ep e r i o d .T h e r ea r eM cities, L unskilled workers, and H skilled
w o r k e r s .T h et i m i n go fe v e n t si sa sf o l l o w s :
1. Workers decide which city to live in so as to maximize expected consumption.
2. Skilled workers in each city draw skill types σj ∈ [0,1] from a uniform distribution.
3. nm ﬁr m se n t e rt h em a r k e ti nc i t ym and pay a ﬁxed cost c.F i r m s ’t y p e sτi are evenly
spaced along the unit circle.
4. Firms post skilled wage rates, wi
H,m,a n do ﬀer to hire any amount of skilled labor, hm,i,
at that wage.
5. Skilled workers decide which ﬁrm to work for. They earn wi
H,m net of a mismatch cost
which depends on |σj − τi|.
6. A Walrasian market for unskilled labor determines the wage rate, wL,m, and ﬁrm
employment, lm,i.








8. Output is consumed.
For simplicity, the model abstracts from multiple industries. Extending the argument to
multiple industries along the lines of section 5.1 requires that agglomeration economies are
not industry speciﬁc. That is, workers must be mobile across sectors so that working in a
large city beneﬁts all skilled workers symmetrically.
Workers: Workers maximize expected consumption. A worker in city m who earns e
consumes e/g(Lm + Hm) where Lm is unskilled employment and Hm is skilled employment
in city m. g represents a congestion cost, such as commuting, which is higher in larger cities.
I assume g0 ≥ 0 and g00 > 0.U n s k i l l e dw o r k e r se a r nwL,m in city m. A skilled worker of type
σj who works for the ﬁrm of type τi earns wi
H net of a mismatch cost, χ |σj − τi|.W o r k e r s
choose the city and ﬁrm which oﬀers the highest expected consumption level.
20Firms: Unskilled labor is hired in a Walrasian market until the wage rate equals the
marginal product:
wL,m = Fl (hm,i,l m,i) (17)
In the problem of setting the skilled wage oﬀer, the ﬁrm takes as given the skilled wages
oﬀered by all other ﬁrms and hence the functional relationship between the wage oﬀer and






















































Firms pays less than marginal product because of monopsony power in the labor market.
A ﬁrm that wants to enter the market pays a ﬁxed cost c. Firms enter until proﬁts are
driven to zero:
F (hm,i,l m,i) − wL,m lm,i − w
i
H,m hm,i = c (20)
5.2.1 Symmetric equilibrium
Consider an equilibrium where all ﬁrms in location m oﬀe rt h es a m es k i l l e dw a g er a t e ,wH,m.
Worker migration equalizes net expected earnings across locations. For unskilled workers
this requires
wL = wL,m /g(Lm + Hm). (21)
where wL is the common real unskilled wage in all places. For skilled workers, the distance
|z| = |σj − τi| is uniformly distributed on [0,0.5 n−1
m ]. Expected skilled earnings are therefore




















To see this, note that for any wi
H,m the ﬁrm hires workers up to the distance z where
the worker is indiﬀerent between ﬁrm i and its nearest competitor. This distance satisﬁes
wi
H,m − χz = wH,m − χ(1/nm − z) or
z =
wi
H,m − wH,m + χ/nm
2χ
(24)


































= Hm/nm, implies (23). Therefore the skilled wage rate in
symmetric equilibrium is given by
wH,m = Fh(Hm/nm,L m/nm) − χ/nm (27)
A symmetric equilibrium is then deﬁned by a vector (Lm,H m,w L,m,w H,m,n m)f o re a c h
location and a pair (wL,w H) that satisﬁes:
• the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order conditions (17) and (27);
• t h ef r e ee n t r yc o n d i t i o n( 2 0 ) ;
• the factor price equalization conditions (21) and (22);
• the labor market clearing conditions
P
mLm = L and
P
mHm = H,
where lm = Lm/nm and hm = Hm/nm. A si sc o m m o ni nm o d e l sw i t ha g g l o m e r a t i o n
economies, it is diﬃcult to rule out multiple equilibria. Whether a unique equilibrium with a
nondegenerate city size distribution exists depends on the functional form of the congestion
cost, g.
5.2.2 Comparative statics
To derive the comparative statics properties of the model, I reduce the equilibrium conditions
for a given location to 3 equations which determine nm,ηm, and Lm + Hm.R e l a t i v ef a c t o r






χ (1 + 1/4)
nm wLg(Lm + Hm)
(28)
The intuition is that more ﬁrms permit better matches, which raises the relative productivity
of skilled labor. This is akin to a high ϕm in the reduced form model outlined above. To
restore relative factor price equalization, it is necessary to employ more unskilled labor,
which reduces its marginal product.
The ﬁrst-order condition for unskilled labor may be written as
Fl (Hm/nm,L m/nm)=wLm = wL g(Lm + Hm) (29)
By virtue of constant returns to scale Fl is an increasing function of Hm/Lm. This implies
that larger cities employ more skilled labor. The intuition is that larger cities must oﬀer
higher wages to unskilled workers in order to oﬀset higher congestion costs.




χ (Lm + Hm)
. (30)
22To see this, note that constant returns to scale imply that
F (Hm/nm,L m/nm) − Fl Lm/nm − Fh Hm/nm =0
which implies
χ/nm · ηm = cn m/ (Lm + Hm).
The main question of interest is: Do larger cities employ more skilled labor without
featuring lower skill premia? The answer presumably depends on the reasons why cities of
diﬀerent sizes coexist. If all cities share the same parameters but there are multiple equilibria,
it follows directly from (29) that larger cities employ more skilled workers. To see this, recall
that Fl is an increasing function of ηm. Larger cities have higher congestion costs (g) and
must therefore pay higher unskilled wages (Fl).
A natural alternative is that cities diﬀer in their agglomeration costs. It does not matter
exactly how g diﬀers across cities as long as a non-degenerate city size distribution exists.
Consider two cities that diﬀer in their equilibrium population sizes (Lm + Hm). The cities
also diﬀer in congestion costs. In the empirically interesting case, the larger city has higher
congestion costs (g). This city must also have a higher ηm to satisfy (29) and a higher nm to
satisfy (30). Finally, this is consistent with (28). Higher values of Lm + Hm and nm reduce
the right-hand side, while a high ηm lowers the left-hand side of (28). This case oﬀers a
micro-foundation for larger cities employing more skill-biased (reduced form) technologies.
The alternative case where g is lower for larger cities could be an equilibrium outcome as
well. Large cities would then pay lower absolute wages and have a fewer skilled workers by
(29) than smaller cities. The comparison of ηm and nm across cities would be indeterminate.
While possible in principle, this case is not empirically interesting.
5.3 Skill-intensive Intermediate Inputs
Very similar implications can be derived from a model of non-traded, diﬀerentiated inter-
mediate inputs. The basic idea is that larger cities oﬀer more diﬀerentiated intermediate
inputs. If the production of these inputs is skill-intensive (e.g., legal or consulting services),
then the reduced form production function of a large city exhibits skill bias. The model
presented here is based on Duranton and Puga (2003). As in the matching model, there are
M locations, indexed by m, L unskilled workers and H skilled workers. Labor is perfectly
mobile across locations. The ﬁnal good is costlessly traded while intermediate goods are not
traded.
Final goods: As i n g l eﬁnal good is produced by a representative ﬁrm in each location
















23is an aggregator of intermediate inputs, xj,w h i c ha r es o l da tp r i c e sqj.T h em a s so fi n t e r -
mediate inputs is nm.T h eﬁrm maximizes period proﬁts:




The price of the ﬁnal good is normalized to one. The ﬁrst-order conditions equate factor
rental prices with marginal products:
wL,m =FL(Xm,L m) (31)
qj =FX(Xm,L m)( X/xj)
ε
1+ε (32)








Intermediate goods: Each intermediate input is produced by one ﬁrm. The production
function uses skilled labor (hj):
xj = βh j − α
where α>0 is a ﬁxed cost. Each ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts in a monopolistically competitive
market, taking the demand function (33) as given. Given the constant elasticity of demand,





where wH,m is the skilled wage rate in place m. Intermediate goods producers costlessly
enter and exit the market. Free entry drives proﬁts to zero at each point in time:
qjxj − wH,mhj =0 (35)
5.3.1 Equilibrium





which implies that each ﬁrm hires


















m . The equilibrium price q then
follows from the demand function (32):































where C2 > 0 is a function of parameters. The reduced form production function of city m
m a yt h e nb ew r i t t e na s






where the skill bias parameter
µm = µC 2 H
ερ
m (41)
is increasing in the city’s skilled population. Note that the expressions for the production
function (40) and the skill premium (39) are the same that would be obtained from a model
where more skilled places employ more skill-biased technologies (as described by (41)), per-
haps due to a local human capital externality.
Equilibrium with migration: To complete the model and derive its implications for
cities of diﬀerent sizes, I add a migration block with congestion costs which is identical to
that of the matching model. The timing of events is as follows:
1 .W o r k e r sc h o o s ew h e r et ol i v ea n dw o r k .
2. Intermediate goods producers hire skilled labor and produce.
3. Final goods producers hire unskilled labor and purchase intermediates.
4. Final goods output is consumed.
An equilibrium with migration consists of a labor allocation (Lm,H m) and prices (wH,m,
wL,m, wL, wH)t h a ts a t i s f y :
1. The skill premium equation (39).
2. The ﬁrst-order condition for unskilled labor (31).
3. The factor price equalization conditions
wH,m =wH g(Lm + Hm) (42)
wL,m =wL g(Lm + Hm) (43)
4. Market clearing:
P
m Lm = L and
P
m Hm = H.
255.3.2 Comparative statics:
As in the matching model, there are two reasons why cities of diﬀerent sizes can coexist:
multiple equilibria and diﬀerences in congestion costs. In both cases, the model delivers
essentially the same predictions as the matching model.
Consider ﬁrst the case of multiple equilibria. Larger cities then have higher congestion
costs. To attract workers, they need to pay higher wages. For unskilled workers, higher
wages require larger Xm/Lm ratios by (31). To satisfy relative factor price equalization,
by (39) larger cities must have larger fractions of skilled workers. Finally, the free entry
condition implies that larger cities have more varieties of intermediate goods (larger nm).
Alternatively, consider the case where the equilibrium is unique, but cities diﬀer in their
congestion costs, g. In the empirically interesting case, larger cities have higher congestion
costs. The implications are then the same as in the case of multiple equilibria.
The main point that emerges from these examples is that matching skilled workers to
jobs and diﬀerentiated intermediate goods oﬀer natural micro-foundations for the reduced
form model of section 5.1. In both cases larger cities employ more skilled-biased (reduced
form) technologies and employ more skilled workers without paying lower skill premia than
do smaller cities.
The more general point is: The micro-foundations of agglomeration models suggest that
skilled workers beneﬁt more from agglomeration than do unskilled workers. This may be
because engineers beneﬁt from interaction with other engineers while janitors do not. Or it
may be because ﬁrms use non-tradable business services that require skilled labor, such as
accounting or consulting services. In either case, agglomeration economies lead to skill-bias in
reduced form technologies and oﬀer a possible explanation for the observations documented
in this paper.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The fraction of persons holding a college degree diﬀers two-fold across U.S. states. This
paper documents the relationship between educational attainment, skill premia, and industry
specialization for U.S. cities and states. The empirical ﬁndings suggest that attainment
diﬀerences stem from local variations in the skill-bias of technologies in use. Impediments
to labor mobility or other sources of regional wage diﬀerences appear to play a minor role.
Models of agglomeration are developed that account for the observed relationship between
attainment, skill premia, and industry specialization.
Future research should attempt to measure the fraction of educational attainment diﬀer-
ences across cities and states that are due to agglomeration economies and other factors.
26Appendix
A Data Sources and Variable Construction
Census Data: The main data sources are the Decennial Censuses from 1940 to 1990.
For 1980 and 1990, the 5% State Samples are used. Data for earlier years are obtained
from IPUMS. The unit of observation is the individual. Table 2 shows summary statistics
at the state level for 1990. The number of persons observed in each state exceeds 10,000.
Samples for earlier years are smaller. In 1940, all states but Nevada have more than 1,000
observations.
Individual wage rates are calculated as the ratio of labor income to hours worked per
year. Wage rates below 10% of the median and above 100 times the median are deleted as
likely measurement errors.
MA codes are taken from the variable MSAPMSA for 1990 and from SMSA in 1980. To
determine whether a person lives in an MA in 1990, I check whether the last 3 digits of
MSAPMSA equal 999. In 1980, I check whether AREATYPE equals 5 ("outside smsas").
Other Data Sources: The population density of states is calculated from county level
data. Population size and land area are taken from the 1998 edition of the Census Bureau’s
USA Counties database. The calculation of Ciccone and Hall’s (1996) measure of density
requires data on state gross product. These are taken from the regional accounts of the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/gsp/) for the years 1979
and 1989.
27State N College η π Frac.MA
AL 86282 0.21 0.22 1.61 0.78
AK 14135 0.26 0.28 1.37 0.44
AZ 78219 0.24 0.26 1.56 0.81
AR 48696 0.18 0.19 1.55 0.52
CA 671010 0.27 0.30 1.50 0.96
CO 82582 0.32 0.33 1.54 0.84
CT 75613 0.35 0.34 1.50 1.00
DE 14759 0.27 0.27 1.56 0.68
FL 288392 0.23 0.24 1.59 0.95
GA 152247 0.24 0.26 1.57 0.82
HI 25384 0.28 0.29 1.38 0.75
ID 21277 0.22 0.23 1.53 0.23
IL 262835 0.27 0.28 1.51 0.89
IN 124333 0.20 0.20 1.47 0.80
IA 58469 0.22 0.22 1.51 0.75
KS 53789 0.27 0.27 1.53 0.69
KY 80475 0.18 0.20 1.51 0.59
LA 89009 0.20 0.24 1.56 0.80
ME 28855 0.24 0.24 1.46 0.65
MD 118035 0.32 0.34 1.50 0.97
MA 143355 0.35 0.35 1.47 0.97
MI 205977 0.21 0.23 1.48 0.83
MN 101648 0.27 0.28 1.52 0.72
MS 54540 0.19 0.21 1.55 0.41
MO 111719 0.24 0.24 1.52 0.72
Table 2: Summary statistics for U.S. states, 1990.
Notes: N: number of persons in the sample. College: fraction of persons holding a college
degree. η: college attainment in eﬃciency units. π: skill premium. Frac.MA: fraction of
population residing in metropolitan areas.
28State N College η π Frac.MA
MT 17350 0.25 0.26 1.41 0.29
NE 33520 0.25 0.25 1.54 0.56
NV 29235 0.18 0.19 1.48 0.91
NH 27570 0.30 0.29 1.49 0.74
NJ 191091 0.34 0.33 1.52 1.00
NM 34710 0.25 0.28 1.56 0.51
NY 417839 0.30 0.31 1.54 0.95
NC 154074 0.22 0.22 1.60 0.65
ND 12920 0.26 0.26 1.54 0.83
OH 242169 0.21 0.23 1.52 0.85
OK 67750 0.23 0.24 1.54 0.84
OR 64259 0.26 0.26 1.47 0.70
PA 267423 0.25 0.25 1.56 0.90
RI 22062 0.28 0.28 1.51 1.00
SC 74539 0.20 0.21 1.58 0.64
SD 13878 0.23 0.23 1.50 0.44
TN 111636 0.21 0.22 1.58 0.74
TX 395277 0.25 0.27 1.62 0.88
UT 34620 0.26 0.28 1.50 0.81
VM 13331 0.30 0.30 1.44 0.44
VA 141962 0.29 0.32 1.59 0.84
WA 113650 0.28 0.28 1.44 0.83
WV 38888 0.16 0.19 1.42 0.54
WI 109786 0.23 0.23 1.50 0.75
WY 10461 0.22 0.22 1.42 0.51
Mean 112633 0.25 0.26 1.52 0.73
Min 10461 0.16 0.19 1.37 0.23
Max 671010 0.35 0.35 1.62 1.00
Table 2: Summary statistics for U.S. states, 1990 (cont.).
BF a c t o r Q u a l i t y D i ﬀerences
The analysis in the main text abstracts from the possibility that unmeasured skills diﬀer
across locations. Yet the data are consistent with an interpretation where more educated
places employ workers with more unmeasured skills.
To capture this possibility, assume that each skilled (unskilled) person in location m is
endowed with αH,m (αL,m) eﬃciency units of skilled (unskilled) labor. Observed factor inputs
are then ˜ Hm = Hm/αH,m and ˜ Lm = Lm/αL,m. Since the empirical analysis uses ratios of
skilled to unskilled labor inputs and wages, the ﬁndings are aﬀected if the ratio αH,m/αL,m
diﬀers across locations.
Consider ﬁrst the case where labor mobility or trade in goods equalizes relative factor
prices across locations. With identical technologies (ϕm), (2) implies that Hm/Lm is equalized
across locations. Therefore, the wage bill ratio in (8) should be the same in all locations. This
prediction is overwhelmingly rejected in the data where the wage bill ratio is very strongly
29correlated with college attainment. Bernard and Schott (2002) use a similar logic to test for
factor price equalization across U.S. states.
However, if relative factor price equalization is violated, the model becomes vacuous.




there exists a ratio
αH,m/αL,m such that the data are consistent with cost minimization. Diﬀerences in un-
measured skills cannot be distinguished observationally from diﬀerences in skill bias across
locations.
The main reason why the possibility of unmeasured skill diﬀerences is not explored fur-
ther in this paper is parsimony. Observed skills do not diﬀer systematically with college
attainment. Theories where labor mobility or trade in goods equalize relative factor prices
oﬀer a parsimonious explanation for this observation. By contrast, theories of unmeasured
skills require a selection mechanism which ensures that locations with large skill quantities ³
˜ H/˜ L
´
also have high relative skill qualities (αH/αL) but low skill premia in eﬃciency units
(assuming that ρ<1). Moreover, the quantitative relationship between ˜ H/˜ L and αH/αL
must be such that states and MAs with diﬀerent attainment levels have approximately the
same measured skill premia. The fact that more educated states employ larger amounts of
educated labor in all industries imposes additional requirements on this selection process. In
this paper, I therefore focus on models with perfect labor mobility and relative factor price
equalization.
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